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THE CREA nON OF A COLONY: 
THE PARADOX OF ECONOMIC AID TO MICRONESIA 
The bJsic problem of underdeveloped countries is dten stated as that of 
c':lpita! forrn~(tion. Those underdeveloped nations that howe especially caught the 
public (;'ye and have demanded the attention of econorllists--particularly the 
countries ()f Asia and Latin America-must struggle with the difficulty of 
.:lccurmrlating enough capital to provide the investments that are so necessary if 
they ever intend to industrialize. Overpopulation in these countries is generally 
looke(! upon as simply an amplification of the problem of capital formation, since it 
means that the barriers have been raised even higher, making additional savings 
necessary in order that any substantial economic progress be achieved. I The 
question that continually plagues these large, rather populous countries is where 
they are to acquire the savings needed for their ascent towards economic 
prosperity. 
This does not seem to be as pressing q problem for tt)e island dependencies. 
that are scattered throughout the Pacific. Although capital formation is something 
of a primary concern in the development of any people, these island groups are 
favored by their close economic ties with a metropolitan wh()se population and 
industrial capabilities are thousands. of times greater than those:of the island. 
colonies. The Trust Territory of the Pacific is administered by the United States, a 
country that could very easily sweep it along to a point ·of prosperity that might 
make Micronesia the envy of the Third World. The Same could be said of other 
island groups in the area. 
The difficulty, therefore, is not in finding a source of capital, but in making 
sure that it is applied judiciously and in the best interests of the developing people. 
It might even be said that the very affluence of the metropolitan in respect to the 
colony constitutes the most serious danger. Lavish expenditures can stunt the 
growth of a developing country and prevent it from reaching the stature that it 
might otherwise have attained. 
This pdper is to be a case study of one of those island groups, Micronesia. 
/\ftN a brief review of the philosophy of ecoll()mic d~;..,i'>t;UlC(, that has guided the 
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administration of these islands by the U.S., we will briJlg to li!:"ht ',OUIC c,f tl,'~ 
problems that have emerged within the past few years as increa~ed flHl(j~ Ildve bel'l I 
poured into a new development program. Finally, we will atternpt to shmv tl,f' 
dilemma that confronts Micronesia on the eve of its political and ceono!]! ic thrust 
forward into the conternporary world. 
TheCase For Natural Growth 
----.--- ---
From the standpoint of economic growth, Micronesia ~hares 5cver ... d severe 
handicaps in common with other, Pacific territories. Its present popUlation ,)f 
90,000 is sprinkled over no less than 96 inhabited islands covering an area of 3 
million square miles. Even after the large outlay required to provide minimal 
transportation throughout the Trust Territory, the manpower pool is anything but 
concentrated. Only on a few central islands is there a population reaching the 
range of four or five thousand. The nearest markets are well removed from 
Micronesia,and shipping is costly. In addition, natural resources are extremely 
Iirnited. With the exception of copra, which brought in 2Y2 miHion doBars during the 
1966 fiscal year, there was no product exported in any appreciable qU<Jntity. 
Despite such serious limitations, there WaS widespread optimism th'ough the 
early years of the U.S. administration that self-sufficiency was a realistic goal for 
the Trust Territory. This belief was sustained in part by the irnpressive record of 
Japanese accomplishments in these islands prior to World War II. With the help nf 
imported labor frorn Okinawa, the Japanese had succeeded in making Micronesia 2[, 
entirely self-supporting colony with a favorable balance of trade. 2 This was again 
to be the goal of the U.S. trusteeship, but with certain qualifications. The pace of 
development was to be geared to the desires and the capacity of the people, 
respect was to be paid their fondness for the traditional patterns of life, and wagc'; 
were to be kept consistent with the productivity of the economy_ GovernITl<':I,t 
appropriations for health and educational services were carefully control1ed in the 
hopes of fashioning a self-contained economy. Capital investment Of! ttw part of 
the U.S. government was called for; however, private investment W.J:, dISUJ'lragc'(:, 
as also in other Pacific colonies, for fear of exploitation and cvcntuul <Jliellalioll 1)( 
the land. In all, this philosophy of economic development was a cautious one tlla t 
was on guard against the "creation of a mendicant economy and th: growth of a 
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subservient spirit among the indigenes.,,3 It rested in the assumption that limited 
quantities of foreign imports could become "incentive goods" to spur the native 
population on towards ever greater productivity. Meanwhile, their commercial 
f'conomy, which would develop side by side with the subsistence economy, was 
based on cash income from copra, fishing, and severd srnaJl-scale agricultural 
ventures.4 
This policy held much to recommend it, even if it was never fully 
implemented by the administration. Blame for this cannot be assigned entirely to 
the administration, however. The annual appropriations allocated to the Trust 
Territory by the U.S. Congress were in the neighborhood of five or six million 
dollars, barely enough to maintain the existing operations. Furthermore, expenses 
were necessarily multiplied by the unavoidable inefficiency that resulted from the 
duplication of facilities throughout the disparate archipelago. Nevertheless, a 
modest attempt at economic development was made, and until 19.56 the income 
from Micronesia'S exports actuaJJy exceeded the cost of its imports. 
By 1960, however, certain hard facts had become evident. Export values had 
reached a plateau at about two milJion dollars. There appeared to ~e little hope 
that economic growth could be accelerated from within the present internal 
structure; a large capital outlay was needed from without for this purp()se. AU 
over the Pacific, colonial powers were awakening to the fact that the solution to 
the problem of their dependencies' self-support did not lie in diversification of 
crops, as aJJ had once believed.5 A large increase in subsidy was needed; but this 
also meant that the powers must prolong their ties wi th their island holdings, where 
once they had dreamed of a rapid economic maturity and an early' severance of 
bonds. 
The New Development Program 
In 1961, a team of economists was sent at the bidding of President Kennedy 
to study the situation in Micronesia. Their recommendations, which were written 
up in the Solomon Report but never released to the public, sparked a program of 
intensive development in the islands. The annual appropriations of the U.S. were , 
raised from seven miHion doJJars in 1961 to a projected 35 milHon dollars in the 
coming fiscal year. Thus far, the greater part of the capital investlnent !ldS be(,f! 
spent to expand the infrastructure, with about two-thirds of the budget going intu 
health and educational improvements.6 
The years between 1961 and the present, then, have witnessed LI. vf)l~e-f~~:_~: 
of administration policy. They deserve closer atten tion, for they have hdd 
important consequences upon the economic, social and political directioll of the 
Micronesian people. It is signi ficant that during this time the primary concern of 
the U.S. administration has been with the development of human resources, an 
emphasis that has been supported by two recently completed studies of the Trust 
Territory.l At the same time, however, the magnitude of the U.S. investment has 
put the cost of maintaining their government well beyond the reach of Micronesia's 
own economic capacity, just as it has occasioned a number of other problems that 
threaten to complicate the territory's maturation process. It should be noted in 
passing that these difficulties are in no way peculiar to Micronesia; they have 
surfaced in most of the other Pacific islands since the end of the War. 
Problems in the Agricultural Sector 
From the very beginning, the possibility of developing plantations with 
industrialized means of cultivation had to be ruled out in Micronesia because of the 
limited land available. Any agriculture there has to be done on plots of modest 
size. Several cash crops, sllch as pepper, cacao, ramie, and vegetables, were tried 
on "an experimental basis; but the results proved somewhat less than spectacular. 
The income brought in by the sale of this produce never amounted to more than it 
tiny fraction of the exports.8 Only a high value cash crop that can be grown 
efficiently on small tracts of land, even in leached soil, could add significantly to 
the island's commercial economy. With the fluctuation of the world market and the 
expense of shipping the small quantities produced, it seems more reasonable to 
stimulate the agricul tural sector to supply a larger portion of the consumption 
needs of the islanders. 
Although roughly 70 percent of the total productive acreage is now being 
farmed, a subsistence level economy is still the rule. The main ohstacle to 
increased productivity is the general prevalence of the traditional land tenure 
patterns, for the land is corporately owned by the clan but parcelled uut to 
.. 
individual family groups to be worked under the old system of multiple km 
obligations. The curtailment of incentive that is built intu such a system has led 
the South Pacific Commission to urge that "land tenure reform, preferably on the 
basis of indivIdual tenure, be recognized as a stimulant to economic deveJopment.,,9 
Introduction of new and more efficient farming methods is also hampered by the 
failure of the young, educated Micronesians to return to the land. 
It was recently estimated that a capital expendi tlJre of nine million dollars 
would be needed to develop the agricultural potential of the Trust Territory. Even 
then, it would be subject to most of the same limitations mpntioned above. On the 
whole, it appears that the agricultural sector, which once promised to make a 
significant contribution to Micronesia's economic growth, appears to have been a 
cilsappointment in this respect. 
The capital expenditures in the new development program undertaken by the 
U.S. in the 1960's were concentrated largely on the expansion of health, education, 
and governmental facilities. The decision to begin in this area was dictated by 
several factors: concern over the high rate of population growth (3Y2 percent), 
criticism of the inadequacy of the existing services by the United Nations' visiting 
teams, and a conviction that the human resources of Micronesia should be 
developed prior to the natural resources. Consequently, funds were poured into the 
construction of new hospitals, schools, and teachers' housing. Money was set aside 
for the hiring of many additional American contract teachers and medical 
supervisors. For the first time, the ideal of universal education for Micronesians 
became a working norm. The quality of education was also stepped up. Not only 
did the percentage of population enrolled in school rise sharply during those five 
years, but the per capita expense on elementary school-children increased fourfold. 
(See Table I). 
The administrative structure of the government grew in size as its new 
program began. Its expansion was, of course, chiefly due to the creation of new 
jobs in order to administer the new social program, but also partly attributable to 
the formation of an indigenous legislative body_ The number of those employed by 
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the government nearly doubled in these five years. Meanwhile, a corresponding rise 
occurred in the number of salaried workers in private enterprise. A considerabk 
number of islanders were drawn into the money economy during tllis period, with 
the principal employer being the Trust Territory government. Most of those who 
earned their salaries in the private sphere were employed in service occupatiolh, 
especiaUy shops, restaurants, and taverns. (See Table II). 
The Effects on Trade ~nd Wages 
Whatever effect all this may have had on the economy of Micronesia, it did 
not bring about any striking increase in the production of marketable good'). 
Income from exports did show some gain, thanks to the more intensive production 
of copra; but while all other products remained relatively static, the sale of scr<lp 
metal became the second largest export of the islands. Within five years, the vallie 
of imported goods, on the other hand, doubled from 4.5 million dollars in 1961 to 9 
miUion dollars in 1966. The flow of dollars out of the economy was three times as 
great as the inflow from the sale of exports. The trade deficit leaped from two 
miJ1ionto six miHion dollars in five years. (See Table III). 
What happened, as it appears, is that the imported goods which were to act 
as an incentive to greater economic productivity have been consumed far beyond 
the economy's ability to pay for them with its own produce. The rabbit is now 
chasing the dog. The "want development" that is described by economists as a 
natural part of the maturing process of a developing country has outrun the 
"d . I" " h " 10 I d f" " m ustrJa lzatlOn t at It was meant to pursue. n or er to mance Its needs, 
Micronesia must rely ever more heavily on government employment. 
There has been recent concern expressed over the rise in wages throughout 
the Trust Territory. Over the five-year period that we are discussing, the average 
salary of the Micronesian worker has increased by 28 percent while the cost 01 
living has risen barely two percent. As more attention is focused upon the disp<.trity 
between the American and Micronesian wage scales in the islands, the government 
is being pressured into slowly breaching the gap between the two. The 
administration already envisages a single scale in the not-too-distant future. Those 
Micronesians on Ebeye who work on the American missile base on nearby Kwajaleir; 
are even now covered by the U.S. minimum wage law. As sympathetic as one may 
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be to the protests of the Micronesian in this regards, it rnu~t lIot be forgotten that 
the wage scale of a country has its roots in the ndtional economy. The "national" 
economy of the U.S. differs quite a bit from that of the Trust Territory-just as 
milch, perh<lps, as the real economy of Micronesia differs from its present 
go\' ~.>rnllieli t-subs ;dized one. 
!}!lproductive Human Resources 
The Nathan Report points out that of Micronesia's 12 miJlion doJlar "national 
income" nine mi1lion dollars come from the U.S. government, most of it in the form 
of salaries. It is the respending of this money that supports the trade and service 
industries in the islands. 1 1 The· entire economy is, therefore, dependent on the 
presence and continued backing of the United States. Granted even the cash value 
of the administration's previous investment in human resources-i.e., the skills and 
education of those who have been or are being schooled at the government's 
expense--the fact remains that they can only be converted into cash by an 
employer with sufficient funds to pay their salaries. In other words, educated 
human beings in a country are simply frozen assets unless their own government, 
private business, or some other agency offers the conditions under which they 
might feed the economy. Many of the educated in Micronesia can make a 
contribution proportionate with their training only because the U.S. has the 
wherewithal to keep them on the payroll. 
As the education process in Micronesia continues to turn out thousands more 
potentially valuable employees, the government is forced to expand to absorb as 
many as possible in~o the administrative structure •. Many others it can simply not 
employ. The payroll grows longer, while the cost of providing for the growing 
social services threatens to devour an ever greater percentage of public funds. It 
has been observed already that the cost of social services is rapidly outstripping the 
capacity of the economy to afford them. (See Table IV). Such a pattern is not 
terribly unsettling, provided there is a rich uncle around to coUect the bills. But if 
a seJf-supporting economy is still the goal of both the administering authority and 
the territory, then the trend must be reversed and proper emphasis given to 
economic development needs. "Economic d~velopment," warns the South Pacific 
Commission, "is itself, the only sound basis f~r social development.,,12 
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The Problems of Urbanization 
A problem concomitant with economic growth and widespread throughl)ut 
the Pacific is that of urbanization. The roots of this phenomenon lie far deeper 
than this study will take us, but we can describe how the problem in Micronesia has 
intensified during the five years under review. 
The population shift into the "port towns" of Micronesia, while it may not be 
very startling in terms of bald figures, is rather high when seen in terms of 
percentage of growth relative to the total population increase. (See Table V). 
Education has undoubtedly played a large role in causing this movement towards 
the towns insofar as it produces among students dissatisfaction with the rigid 
controls of the traditional Village life and a sense of frustration at the outmoded 
agricultural economy. In some cases, education has the added effect of creating 
aspirations among the young that cannot easily be satisfied in an economy which is 
ill-equipped to offer either a sufficient range or number of occupational 
opportunities. When there are relatively few in a society who have completed 
twelve years of schooling, the high school graduate is inclined to look upon himself 
as a member of the "white-coUar" elite and to disdain the manual work of the 
tradesman or mechanic. 
In Micronesia, education has prepared a fairly sizable labor force of young 
literate people and freed them from a subsistence life on the land. Urbanization 
has concentrated them around the district centers; but, aside from a limited 
number of government jobs, no productive employment exists at present. Many 
finally do obtain some kind of work--often in the stores or town bars-which is 
only a species of "underemployment".13 Such a solution produces, at best, 
temporary relief. Occasionally their frustration at the inconsistency of a society 
that educates them and then offers them no suitable employment is vented in 
violence and rioting, as in the Fiji riots of 1959. Often enough it takes on other 
forms, less dramatic if equal1y symptomatic. l4 
Industrialization As the Answer? 
The solution to almost everyone of the difficulties described Cibove comes 
easily-an economic development program must be begun as soon as possible. In 
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point of fact, preliminary studies have been road\.. and the program alrc.idy 
ina'_lgerated by the U.S. government. Thf~ prof,osed plan demands a total 
investment of about J 50 million dollars; half of \vhich j.;; to be put into the 
infrastructure, the rf:'st to be lIsed for the development of industry in the islands. 
In i.l sense, the implementation of this plan will signal .. l full tllrn-about from the 
earlier administrative policy that insisted upon a natllraJ, self-induced pattern of 
economic growth. The new catadystic appro,ich t for all the upset it causes among 
the conservative members of a tradition-bound society, is supported by strong 
argumoents: 
If the economic development of Micronesia is limi ted to the rate of 
growth which can be generated by resources of locdl ownershipt the 
few local owners wiH prosper, but the total investment wiH be so 
limited that it wiJl leave the great majority of people with few 
employment opportunities, high prices. ;wd short':IJ~es of goods and 
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serVIces. 
TflUS, it seems that a planned program is required if the haphazard and lopsided 
distribution of weaJth so common in developing countries is to be avoided. 
~ Paradox of Over-Support 
According to the terms of its Trusteeship Agreement, the United States has 
a legally defined obligation to "promote the economic advancement and self-
sufficiency of the inhabitants of Micronesia." 16 The responsibility of the United 
States towards the Trust Territory should be a guarantee of its resolve, while the 
magnitude of U.S. resources insures the availability of the means to help 
Micronesia through capital investment. From this point of view, the Micronesian 
people are more fortunate than most. As is often the caset though, factors like 
these can be double-edged; they can be as hazardous as they are helpful. The U.S. 
must strike a delicate balance in its relationship with its dependency. While 
insuring the conditions for economic development, it must resist the temptation to 
perpetually carry the territory along, thereby denying it any opportunity to learn 
how to walk on its own. 
As the pluf1s for 11k' industrialization of Micronesiu leave till' drdf Llllg-bourd, 
it is ironic that many of the obstacles to their realization are the consequences d 
the administration's program of social development during the 1960's. 
Private investment must play a large role in the islands' economic 
development wi thin the next few years. The creation of a commercial fistllllg 
industry, manufacturing, construction, and tourism require capital investmellt 
estima ted at about 75 mill ion dollars. 17 Even though Micronesia has more than its 
share of limitations when it comes to industrialization, we might expect them to be 
somewhat counter-bal<ll1ced by its cheap and relatively abundant supply of 
rnanpower. The truth is that inflationary wages have raised the cost of labor in 
Micronesia well above that of Asian countries such as Taiwan and the Philippine,>. 
Unskilled and semi-skilled labor in the Trust Territory is too dispersed and too 
expensive to offer mucilof an attraction for foreign investors. It is true that th~ 
young and educated, who constitute c. raiJidly expanding segment of the populati,)n, 
rnust be counted as one of the most valuable potential resources of Micronesia. 
Industrialization may well offer them the new job opportunities they seek within 
the managerial or entrepreneurial class, but only if a large supply of ~emi-skilled 
labor can first be found. 
When the first commercial fishery began its operations in Palau a few years 
dgO, Okinawans had to be brought in to conduct the actual fishing operations. 
Palauans took the supporting jobs which were,for the most part, land-based ,)Ilci 
better paid. The five thousand dollars a month in salaries that flows into the 
Palauan economy is totdlly dependent upon the presence of foreign labor. This lias 
led to the suggestion that cheap Asian labor be imported to answer the demands of 
a ldbor requirement that might rise to between 20 and 30 thousand persons in a few 
years.18 To attempt this classic solution, one that has been applied in many parts 
of the Pacific before, would be to invite the same social problems that have arisen 
in HLlwaii, Fiji, and Tahiti. 
Another alternative, of course, is to utilize to its fullest the indigenous lanor 
force that already exists in the islands. The figures in Table VI show that the 
present nllmht'r of p{'r';on~i between tIl{' ages of 15 and 65 (exclusive of Ilous('wiv('s 
and stlJdcnts) is about 21 tllousdnd. Population figures indicate thL.lt this Ilumber i·.:. 
growing by at least another thousand each year.19 Apart frolT! the problem of 
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3djusting wages to a realistic level of productivity, a more serious social difficulty 
is encountered. For efficient employment of this manpower pool, most people 
would have to be relocated near the "industrial" centers. Such a policy would 
require that they subordinate traditional values associated with their family lands 
.md their clan ties to the economic growth of the territory. It is unlikely that this 
change of attitude could be carried out in a short period of time. 
Perhaps the Jabor difficulties in Micronesia arc only il1ustrative of what 
must inevitably happen when development of human resources precedes, rather 
than parallels, economic development. 
Creati.!:!& Permanent Dependence 
Our final observation rests upon a point that was made earlier. We have 
seen that the cost of maintaining its infrastructure has long since outdistanced 
Micronesia's economic means. Through the largess of the United States, Micronesia 
has been elevated to the status of a parasite economy. 
This is inconsequential as long as U.S. funds hold out and the territory does 
not mind being a permanent economic ward of the United States. It only' presents a 
uitical problem when national aspirations begin to mount, when the territory 
regards political independence as a worthy goal, and when the new nation Sees 
economic servitude as a more subtle variety of political domination. It is difficult 
to predict whether Micronesia will ever arrive at this point or whether it wiU be 
peacefuUy assimilated into the United States in some form or other. RegardJess of 
the turn of future events, if the people of Micronesia are to be given a true option, 
self-sufficiency must remain the aim of aU devleopment that takes place. 
Otherwise, the political question will have been long since decided by the economic 
dependence that Micronesians wi11 have come to accept as a matter of course. 
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TABLE I 
1961 1966 % increa5e 
Total Population 78,000 90,000 15 96 
No. of students 17,000 28,000 65 
Percent of total 2296 31% 9 
population in school 
Per capita educe $34 $120 253 
expense for ele-
mentary school 
TABLE II 
1961 1966 % increase 
No. of persons employed 4,200 7,600 55 % 
for wages 
Total salaries $3.3 miUion $7.7 million 133 
No. of persons employed 2,700 5,100 89 
"" by government 
Total salaries of $2.5 million $5.8 million 133 
government employees 
Average annual per capita 
income of employees $790 $1010 28 
]2 
TABLE III 
1961 1966 % increase 
Total value of 
Exports $2. I million $3.0 mill ion 43 % 
Total value of 
Imports $4.5 mi!lion $9.0 million 100 
TABLE IV 
1961 1966 96 increase 
Cost of administ. 
serv ices (health, 
educ., polit., & $1.2 million $6. g mill ion 467,96 
social) 
Per capita cost of 
admin. services $15 $75 400 
TABLE V 
Towns and Population: 1961 1966 96 increase 
Koror 3,933 4,975 24 96 
KoJonia (Ponape) 1,195 1,674 40 
Moon 3,080 4,380 42 
Ebeye 1,443 1,879 100 
Majuro 3,900 5,187 33 
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TABLE VI 
Labor Force Occupation Structure* 
(Excludes under 15 and 65 and over, 
Foreign Born, Students, and HOllsewives) 
Occupation 
Professional, technical 
Managerial, administrative 
Clerical 
Carpenter, handicrafter, 
other crafts and trades 
Operators, service workers 
Copra, subsistence, agriculture, 
fishing, and other 
Total 
Total 
1,829 
629 
807 
2,416 
2,483 
20,985 
*Figures are for 1967. Taken from ..5tanfor~ Re.QSl.~!, p. 24 
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Percent 
3.0 
3.9 
11.5 
11.8 
61.1 
100.0 % 
FOOTNOTES 
1 • See Gerald Moiur, "The Problem of Limited Economic Development," in The 
g~:onomics of Underdevelopment, ed. Agarwala and Singh (New York: t963), 
pp. 57ff. The author quotes Ricardo: "To say that there is a great abundance 
of labour is to say that there is not an adequate capital to employ it." 
2. Tadao Yanaihara, Pacific Islands Under Japanes~ Mand~te (New York: 1940), 
pp. II ff. 
3. Donald J. O'Connor, An Economic Perspecti ve of the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific (Saipan: 1952), p. 4. 
4. The proponents of this economic policy were chiefly O'Connor, 22. cit., and 
Douglas Oliver, Planning Micronesia's Future (Cambridge: 1951). Both works 
had a strong influence on government planning in the early years of the Civil 
Administration in Micronesia. 
5. See Jacques Barrau, "The Limitation of Agricultrual Expansion in the Tropical 
Pacific," A Paper given to the South Pacific Commission at the Regional 
Technical Meeting on Economic Development, NOllmea, New Caledonia, 
March 12-22, 1962 (Noumea: 1962). 
6. Above information can be found in the statistical appendices to 19th Annual 
Report ~ the United Nationa ~ the Administration of th~ Trust Territorr of 
the Pacific: 1966. 
7. These two studies are: Nathan Associates, Inc. An Economic Development 
for Micronesia, A Report prepared for the High Commissioner of the Trust 
Territory, April, 1967; and Standford Research Institute, Planning for 
Education and Manpower in Micronesia (Menlo Park, Cal.: 1967). 
8. Exports and their value for fiscal year 1966 were as follows: copra, 
$2,500,000; scrap metal, $237,000; handicraft, $88,000; trochus, $71,000; 
vegetables, $20,000; fish, $78,000. Earnings from ramie, cacao, and pepper 
were apparently so insignificant as not to be listed. 
9. South Pacific Commission, "Summary of Recommendations," in A Report of 
the Regional Technical Meeting on Economic Development, Noumea, New 
Caledonia, March 12-22, 1962 (Noumea: 1962), p. 2. 
10. Meier, 22. cit., pp. 69-70. 
11. Nathan Associates, Inc., Summarr and Index, p. 4. 
12. South Pacific Commission, ~. cit., p. 8. 
13. Alfredo Navarrete, "Underemployment in Underdeveloped Economies," in 
Economics of Underdevelopment, pp. 341ff. 
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14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
No figure giving the number of unemployed graduates are available; I am 
guided only by personal observations. 
Nathan Associates, Inc., 2E. cit., p. 31. 
United Nations, Trusteeship A~reement for theTrust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands, Art. 6 (New York: 1947 , p.3. 
Nathan Associates, Inc., 2E. cit. p. 30. 
Nathan Associates, Inc., 2E. cit., p. 34. 
Stanford Research Institute, 2E,. cit., p. 22. 
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